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FORESEEABILITY AND RECOVERY IN TORT
THE PROBLEM
VEN well-informed first-year law students know that there
is still a conflict between two points of view upon the
question of whether damages for breaches of legal duty which
are not intentional must be "proximate" or foreseeable in
order that they may be redressed with money.
They also know that the newer theory is that the test
of "foreseeability" usually ought not to be applied, but rather
that the author of a cause, which is a breach of legal duty,
should be held responsible for all actual results whether
foreseeable or not, even when the breach of legal duty is
mere negligence.
Such is the influence of a Bohlen.' And in New York
there is special reason for interest in the newer view-for
was not Mr. Justice Cardozo one of Bohlen's collaborators
in the Restatement of the Law of Torts wherein all this gains
at least persuasive authority? 2
The "newer" view, however, is still novel enough so that,
even today, it is still a minority, view in this, at least: That
there are yet more decisions holding for a necessity that
damages be foreseeable or proximate, in negligence law, at
least, in order that they be compensable, than cases repudiat-
ing the necessity of foreseeability and granting recoveries
when damages not foreseeable actually flowed from uninten-
tional breaches of legal duty as consequential results.3
' Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability
in Negligence, ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF TORTS 1, 40 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 79, 148
(Feb.-Mar., 1901). Also Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Restdting from
Negligence Withwut Impact, ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF TORTS 252, 41 Am. L.
Reg. (N. s.) 141 (Mar., 1902).
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§231-328, 430-453. Therein the test of an
injuria is clearly made to be the existence of a risk. Nota bene §§435, 436.
'Bohlen says in "The Probable or the Natural Consequence," supra note 1,
in his second paragraph, quoting from Hoag v. R. R., 85 Pa. 293, 298 (1877) :
"The siel [italics mine] test of a negligent wrongdoer's liability for the
results of his wrong in these cases [i. e., negligence cases] is that announced
by Paxson, J., in Hoag v. R. R.: 'The injury must be the natural consequence
of the negligence-such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances
of the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely
to follow from the act'
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So cases like Mitchell v, Rochester Railway Company,4
criticized so frequently even in the jurisdiction responsible
for it, 5 still cause trouble for school men and students alike.
Unquestionably many of the former are unable to escape the
notion that its presence in New York's corpus juris enmeshes
us in the web of uncertainty, if, indeed, it does not for the
time being make it altogether unwise to teach the newer view
as the accepted one. And this in spite of the Restatement,6
of course!
We compromise by saying, "Unquestionably it will be
limited in its application to cases involving precisely its own
facts," and point to Comstock v. Wilson 7 and Carroll v. New
York Pie Baking Company.8 We even say, "Where the Court
of Appeals has not spoken the Restatement will no doubt be
followed; but if New York has an entrenched rule, the Re-
statement will not be enough to make the Court of Appeals
reverse it. Deprecation with a view to legislative aid will
probably be the extent of the Restatement's influence here."
How, then, account for Parnell v. Holland Furnace Com-
pany,9 wherein New York, the chief antagonist of the "attrac-
tive nuisance" rule 10 when accepted by the majority of
states, seems, when the adherents of the doctrine were on
the way toward becoming a mere minority," to have adopted
it? Was this not a result of the Restatement's influence? 12
No matter what is the outcome of the uncertainty about
the Mitch ell case, it seems incontrovertible to the writer that
the "newer view" referred to above should be taught as a
"This of itself would indicate that in such cases the wrongdoers responsi-
bility fo' the cmsequences of his act was to be restricted to his reasonable
anticipations." (Italics mine.) His article continues to disprove the validity
of the thesis quoted.
'151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
'Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 234, et seq., 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
0 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §436 (2).
'Supra note 5.
'215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y. Supp. 553 (2d Dept. 1926).
p260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112 (1932).
" Walsh v. Fitchburg Railway, 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895);
Flaherty v. Metro Stations, 202 App. Div. 583, 196 N. Y. Supp. 2 (4th Dept.
1922), aff'd,'253 N. Y. 605, 139 N. E. 753 (1930) ; Joffy v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
Co., 118 Misc. 147, 192 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1922).
BuRDicK, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1926) §§488, 489.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §339.
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more nearly valid theory than the time-worn attitude exem-
plified in the Mitchell case.
In classroom and conversation it becomes necessary, for
the clarification of the minds of one's auditors, to paraphrase
the statements of Bohlen and the abstractions of the Restate-
ment. Each teacher has pet formulae. The writer has
found it serviceable to interpret the modern attitude, involv-
ing, as it does in its beginnings, the first fundamental of the
theory of legal liability, in a rather simple way.
The first proposition may be stated as follows: Given
an act or an omission from which it can be reasonably fore-
seen that harm will be a probable consequence, we have been
given a breach of legal duty.
The reader must bear in mind, of course, that the writer
most certainly is not claiming originality for this thesis or
any of the others touched upon in this short essay; rather he
is describing a formula, found by trial to be serviceable, for
interpreting the words and thoughts of the masters, written
for other scholars, in a manner which will give to the first-
year law student an understanding of the problem of foresee-
ability, and how the moderns deal with it and what the
prospect is.
This first proposition is, as stated, fundamental. Dis-
ciples of the new and adherents of the old alike can agree,
for the most part, upon it as the basis of liability in tort-
for negligence at least.
It is not infallible as a test, for economic considerations
sometimes justify a departure from it. 13 So do other mat-
ters of public necessity, as, for instance, those which have
given rise to the judicial and legislative privileges, the police
power and the like.
All tort cases, unless they be among the exceptions
stated or others similar to them, exemplify this first proposi-
tion of ours if they are well-reasoned by an understanding
court.
Particularly excellent as recent illustrations are Kali-
nowski v. Truck Equipment Company 14 (as compared with
"Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478 (1873); Booth v. Rome, etc., Co., 140
N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893).
" 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N. Y. Supp. 657 (4th Dept. 1933).
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Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 15), and Glanzer v. Shep-
ard "I (as compared with Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche 17) ; Smith v. Peerless Glass Company,'8 Burrows v.
Livingston-Niagara Power Company,'9 DeHaen v. Rockwood
Sprinkler Company 20 and the Parnell case ittelf.
The development of the proposition (with respect to
the significance of foreseeability upon it) is perfected by
comparisons of these cases with each other. In collaboration
with another analyst of trends, the writer has previously
commented similarly.21
The sum total of such comparisons results in a revision
of our first proposition so that it now reads: Given an act
or omission from which it can be reasonably foreseen that
harm will be a probable consequence to a certain person, we
have been given a breach of legal duty to that person, but
not to anyone else to whom harm could not have been rea-
sonably foreseen as a probable consequence.
The plaintiff in the Palsgraf case was denied a recovery
because, from the act of the guard in pushing another passen-
ger into a train, no harm to the plaintiff, some distance
away, could reasonably have been foreseen as a probable con-
sequence. Therefore, what the guard did to the passenger,
whether or not a breach of legal duty to him, was not a
breach of legal duty to the plaintiff.
She did not lose because a breach of legal duty to her
resulted in damages not foreseeable. She lost because there
was no probability of harm to her and therefore the occur-
rence was not a breach of legal duty to her at all.
We come to the next proposition, which may be stated
as follows: Given a breach of legal duty, the defendant is
liable for all the actual consequences thereof and not only
for the foreseeable consequences.
No better example of the validity of this view can be
found than in subdivision (2) of Section 436 of the Restate-
-248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
"233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
'7255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
-0259 N. Y. 292, 182 N. E. 225 (1932).
"0244 N. Y. 548, 155 N. E. 892 (1926).
1258 N. Y. 350, 179 N. E. 764 (1932).
'EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1933) §151.
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ment.: "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an
unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to amother other-
wise than by subjecting him to fright, shock or other similar
and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such
harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or
emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from lia-
bility." (Italics mine.)
If the Mitchell case is still law in New York, however,
this illustration does not greatly help us. It is necessary,
-therefore, to seek for other applications of the test.
Section 435 of the Restatement is as follows: "If the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner
in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable."
(Italics mine.)
In the explanatory notes upon this section, three cases 22
are cited as the sources of the illustrations of the application
of the section. These three cases will repay comparative and
critical reading. A fourth case 23 is mentioned in the notes
but is not used in the illustrations. In this case "the fall of
a heavy plank into the hold of a vessel was held to be the
sole cause of its destruction by fire although the arbitrators
were left in doubt" as to how fumes from the gas line in the
ship's hold were ignited by the fall of the plank. Not cause and
effect but post hoc ergo propter hoc, perhaps, brought about
the factual determination that the fall of the plank was the
producing cause of it all. However, it is respectable English
authority and serves our present purpose well, for surely
few will argue that where no flame is involved the starting
of a fire is reasonably to be foreseen from the falling of a
plank into the hold of a ship, even though there is a gas
line below. Yet everyone must admit that carelessness in
handling a plank so that it drops is a breach of legal duty
because the probability of harm to persons about (as the
' Hill v. Winson, 118 Mass. 251 (1875); Twin City Gas Co. v. Smith, 83
N. H. 439, 144 Atl. 783 (1929) ; Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. St. 363, 21 Atl.
31 (1891). The explanatory notes are to be found in Tentative Draft No. 8
of the Restatement at 102, under old §310.
' Polemis v. Furness Withy & Co., Ltd. [C. A. 1921] 2 K. B. 560.
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plaintiff was) is reasonably to be foreseen as a result, though
the harms foreseeable are utterly different from those which
did actually result. Nor is this in conflict with the Pclsgraf
case, for there is surely greater risk to all nearby when a
heavy plank is carelessly handled, than is involved, as far
as standers-by are concerned, in exerting pressure upon a
person to aid him into a train.
For strong evidence of the substantial validity in New
York of this second proposition of ours, we have only to
look at that line of New York cases wherein the defendant's
negligence creates apparent danger in which the plaintiff
himself acts to his own harm and the defendant is held
liable, -4 and to the rule, established in New York by Elhrgott
v. Mayor,25 under which the city of New York was held
responsible for illnesses resulting from exposure to the ele-
ments consequential upon an accident caused by the failure
of the city to keep one of its streets free from dangers to
travel. The condition of disrepair was a nuisance, no doubt,
and the failure to make it safe, negligence-in any event
there was a breach of legal duty because the situation was
foreseeably and probably productive of accidents. But that,
as a result of such an accident, there would be spinal disease
from incidental exposure of a traveler involved was certainly
not foreseeable or probable, yet the traveler properly suc-
ceeded in his action.
On the other hand, New York has not only the rule of
the Mitchell case but also an arbitrary rule limiting liability
for spreading fire as illustrative remnants of the "older
theory." 26 However, here, as with the Mitchell case rule,
we have an anachronism which is being not extended but
closely restricted in its application.2 7
The very fact that the outworn Mitchell case and Hoff-
man case rules are being limited is further evidence of the
Twomley v. Railroad, 69 N. Y. 158 (1877); Poulson v. Nassau Elect.,
18 App. Div. 221, 45 N. Y. Supp. 941 (2d Dept. 1897); Poulsen v. Nassau
Elect., 30 App. Div. 246, 51 N. Y. Supp. 933 (2d Dept. 1898); Kreuzen v.
42nd, etc. R. Co., 38 Sup. Ct. 461, 13 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1891).
_96 N. Y. 264 (1884).
'Hoffman v. King, 160 N. Y. 618, 55 N. E. 401 (1899) ; Bird v. St. Paul,
etc., Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86 (1918).
'Homac Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 258 N. Y. 462, 180 N. E. 172 (1932).
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ground gained and held, even in New York, by this second
proposition of ours, exemplifying what I have called the
"newer theory."
In passing, to forestall the hasty, it should here be
pointed out that only in the broad sense are we as yet dis-
cussing "proximate cause." In the true and technical sense
these observations have so far had little or nothing to do
with problems of proximate and remote causes, for these
require the involvement of two or more culpable agencies
under control of at least two non-identical persons. What
we are discussing ought rather be called the "proximateness
of damages." And we have concluded that there is little
necessity for the existence of any metaphysical "proximate-
ness" of damages suffered as the actual consequences of a
conceded breach of legal duty, when the breach of duty is
negligence, at least.
Thus we come to our third proposition, which does deal
with proximate and remote causation: Given two breaches
of legal duty entering into the causation of harm, under cir-
cumstances which do not constitute the actor's "concurrent
tort feasors" but wherein the act or omission of the later
actor was instigated or induced by the act or omission of
the earlier, the earlier actor will not be held free from lia-
bility, in spite of the culpability of the later actor, if the
earlier could reasonably have foreseen that the later actor
might be induced by the earlier cause to act as he did.28
Many New York cases illustrate this as a well-founded
(if not quite thoroughly understood) principle.2 9  The
reader must not be led astray by judicial attempts to justify
the conduct of the later actor.3 0  Clearly in such cases the
culpability of the later actor's conduct was and is unimpor-
tant, because it was, whether culpable or not, a foreseealile
intervention rather than causatively a superseding influence.
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §447 (C).
' Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N. Y. 1822); Vandenberg v. Truax, 4
Denio 464 (N. Y. 1847); Lowery v. Man. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 158, 1 N. E. 608(1885); Williams v. Couler, 41 App. Div. 426, 58 N. Y. Supp. 863 (2d Dept.
1899).
For cases out of New York see Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. B1. 892, 3 Wils.
403 (Eng. 1773); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft. No. 8) old §322 (c)
at 108.
' Lowery v. Man. R. Co., Vandenburgh v. Truax, both supra note 29.
FORESEEABILITY IN TORT
Equally clear is the fact that these attempts to decide that
the conduct of the later actor was not culpable arose out of
the failure of the judicial mind completely to grasp the
philosophy of this proposition.
In cases involving an "inducing cause," the author of
that cause is held liable if he ought to have realized (i. e., if
the average person would have been aware) that the inter-
vening conduct, culpable or not, of the later actor might have
been induced by the earlier cause. If the conduct of the
second person is not foreseeable, it is a "superseding cause."
An example of such superseding cause as discharges the
earlier actor is frequently to be found when the contribution
of the later actor is that almost never-to-be-foreseen occur-
rence-a crime.31
Lastly, foreseeability as the important test in cases in-
volving our third and last proposition relating to inducing
and induced causes is not eliminated or even devaluated by
such cases as Stone v. Boston 1. Co.,32 for in that case there
was no question of inducement. Rightly or wrongly decided
-and the writers of the Restatement quite evidently disagree
with it because of the foreseeability of the teamster's con-
duct 33-the Stone case evidences a view that though the
groundwork for harm be prepared by the earlier actor's
wrongful conduct, there is no liability on his part if the
later and intervening actor, through independently culpable
conduct, merely builds on the foundation erected by the
earlier. The Stone case does not enter into our discussion,
however, for, no matter how readily foreseeable was the con-
duct of the teamster with his match, that conduct was not
induced by the oil-soaked platform.34
' Benenson v. Nat. Sur. Co., 260 N. Y. 299, 183 N. E. 505 (1932);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §448.
' 171 Mass. 536, 51 N. E. 1 (1898).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft. No. 8) old §322 (a), (b) at 108.
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §447 (a), (b).
I There is ground for criticism of this case in the light of the tendency
toward a strict view of the responsibility of the earlier actor. The Restate-
ment expresses it (sapra note 33). Certainly the conduct of the teamster was
not independently a competent and producing cause, though it was independently
culpable. Not the match of the teamster alone, but also the presence of the
oil-soaked platform of the defendant railroad, brought about the harm to the
plaintiff. Under these circumstances the writer inclines toward the view that
the actors are concurrently liable, since the causative contribution of each was
a substantial factor in producing the harm.
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THE PROSPECT.
In the writer's experience, the above approach and devel-
opment eliminate most of the student's bugaboos concerning
the much misunderstood "doctrine of foreseeability," as he
calls it.
With substantial and workable, though not universal
and absolute, accuracy-and whatever may be true of some
of the fields of the law, there is not to be discovered any-
thing absolute in the one we have been tilling-he thus con-
cludes:
Foreseeability is important in determining whether con-
duct is tortious, but not in testing damages in the effort to
discover whether they are compensable ex delicto.
Hadley v. Baxendale35 making foreseeability, in effect,
the test for compensability of damages ew contractu, estab-
lishes the only possible rule for a branch of the law whose
purpose is to effectuate the express and implied terms of
agreements between persons; for who can reasonably say
that any contracting party contemplates liability for dam-
ages the likelihood of which is not known and is not brought
home to him? But this rule has no place in the law of torts
whose purpose has to do with tle creation of philosophic
standards of conduct based on probable results, and to ad-
minister justice upon the fact of illegal conduct so as to
compensate for the actual results of that conduct. Harm
which has flowed from wrongdoing need not be probable;
happening has made it certain. Nothing in the theory of
tort liability justly limits responsibility to intended conse-
quences or even to apparently intended consequences. Such
restriction inheres only in liability for breaches of contract,
wherein alone apparent intention is the beginning and the
end of the law and the prophets.
As new situations arise in our law requiring a choice
between the application of the "older theory" and the appli-
cation of the "newer," they are certain to be dealt with
according to the modern view that foreseeability is not a
test for compensability when harm has followed consequen-
S9 Exch. 341 (Eng. 1854).
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tially upon a wrong. Moreover, there will be relief against
the errors which are still with us. The rules of mistaken
decisions are being and will continue to be limited. A com-
plete cure will probably depend upon legislative aid, almost
certainly as far as the Hoffman case 36 is concerned, for the
Bird case,37 deploring but following it, is.still recent. Perhaps
the remedy for the evils of the Mitchell 38 decision will come
about naturally through evolution of the case law; but prob-
ably here, too, it will remain for the legislature to remove
the vestigial traces, for stare decisis will still be stare decisis
more often than not in cases exactly on all fours with defi-
nite precedents until many agitators have come and gone.
However, there is always a chance, of course, that the Court
of Appeals will itself accomplish the change, without legis-
lative aid, as it did in deciding the Parnell case.3 9
DAVID S. EDGAR, JR.
St. John's University School of Law,
November 7, 1934.
Supra note 26.
'Supra note 26.
n Supra note 4.
Supra note 9.
